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Members of a rock and roll band are endowed with different creativity. They match and eventually 
obtain credit for song writing as well as a share of the returns from sales. More creative members 
increase the probability of success but may also claim a larger share of the pie. In our theoretical 
model, the nature of matching (postive or negative assortative) as well as the covariation between the 
probability of having a “hit” and the dispersion of credits given to individual members are a function 
of the completeness of contracting. When members adopt a “gentleman’s agreement” to share credits 
equally, the covariation between the probability of a hit and the dispersion of credits is negative, 
which  is  the  consequence  of  positive  assortative  matching  in  creativity.  The  data  show  that  the 
relation between dispersion and success is significantly negative, and that rock bands are thus likely 
to sign incomplete contracts. 
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 1 Introduction
In his analysis of the “battle” between the Beatles and the Beach Boys, Clydesdale
(2006) suggests that the Beatles “should not be seen as creative geniuses but as a
creative process, [behind which] were two dominant forces. First was the importance
of rivalry with the Beach Boys and [secondly] the nature of the working team that
possessed high levels of exchange and complementary blends of expertise and thinking
styles.” Clydesdale also suggests “that the structure of incentives is important in
determining the nature of the creative output.”
Indeed, when production is joint, the charactersitics of partners and the nature
of contracts are crucial in explaining the success or the failure of the partnership.
Better partners increase the probability of success but may also claim a larger share
of the pie. If contracts are complete, for instance if partners can choose an output
contingent sharing rule ex ante, then the way they will match in partnerships is
eﬃcient: it is not possible to rematch agents in a way to increase total surplus in the
industry. However, if contracts are incomplete, for instance if it is diﬃcult to commit
to sharing rules that are sensitive to the types of the partners, the way agents match
is not necessarily surplus maximizing and can be quite diﬀerent from the matching
under complete contracting.2
This suggests that the pattern of matching can be an indicator of the degree of
contract completeness. However, it is often diﬃcult to measure directly the types of
agents and therefore the nature of the matching pattern. This is the case here since
we are concerned with how musicians endowed with diﬀerent levels of creativity (for
song writing) form groups. Creativity is not observable directly but can be indirectly
measured by the number of credits that members of the band receive for writing
songs. We develop a model where agents with diﬀerent levels of creativity match
and produce a joint output. When creativity within the group fails, the partnership
can purchase a song created by other creators (outsourcing). Songs created within
the group are more likely to succeed (think of them as speciﬁc to the group members’
2See Legros and Newman (2007) for a general analysis of matching models with nontransferabil-
ities.
2characteristics) than those created by outsiders. We consider two speciﬁcations of
the model, one in which the members of the group can sign complete contracts,
where, in case of success, the share of each partner can be speciﬁed freely, and
another speciﬁcation in which members are limited to incomplete contracts and use
a “gentlemen’s agreement” to share equally the returns from the activity.
The composition of the group aﬀects the probability of creating within the group
and the probability of outsourcing songs. When contracts are complete, musicians
match in a negative assortative way: the most creative match with the least cre-
ative. Under incomplete contracting, musicians match in a positive assortative way:
more creative musicians match with more creative musicians. This diﬀerence in the
matching pattern has also consequences for the relationship between an index which
measures the “dispersion of creativity” within the group (and is directly related to
the matching pattern) and the probability that the group will have a “hit.”
In the complete contract speciﬁcation, there is a positive relationship between
dispersion and success while when contracts are incomplete, this relation is nega-
tive. The data show that the relation between dispersion and success is signiﬁcantly
negative, and that rock bands are thus likely to sign incomplete contracts.
2 Specifying matchings
We consider groups where members are jointly involved in the creation and produc-
tion of songs. Musicians have a creative type that is distributed with distribution
F(a) on [0;1]; to simplify, we restrict attention to symmetric distributions.
Each group tries to create one song and produce it. A song that is “normal”
brings a proﬁt L while a “hit” brings a proﬁt H > L.
For a given group ⟨a;b⟩, the process of creation is such that
• with probability (1 − a)(1 − b) no member succeeds in creating a song. The
group can then buy a song at market price q. This song will become a hit with
a low probability pL.
• with probability a(1 − b) member a creates the song and gets the credit while
3with probability (1−a)b member b creates it and gets the credit. Because the
song is created within the group, it becomes a hit with probability pH, where
pH > pL.
• with probability ab both members succeed in creating the song, which then
becomes a hit with probability pH. Because the creation is joint in this case,
each musician receives a credit.
2.1 Matchings and success
Let
W = pLH + (1 − pL)L
V = pHH + (1 − pH)L
be the expected proﬁts when the group buys a song from an outsider and when it
produces a song created by one of its members. Clearly V > W since pH > pL and
H > L.
At the time of creation of the band, the expected total proﬁt is
(a;b) = (1 − a)(1 − b)(W − q) + [a(1 − b) + b(1 − a) + ab]V:
In the complete contracting case, proﬁts are fully transferable between members; in
the incomplete contracting case, proﬁts are imperfectly transferable and we consider
the extreme situation where proﬁts are shared equally.3 The other case corresponds
to what the industry refers to as a “gentlemen’s agreement”.
The set of feasible payoﬀ allocations within a group reﬂects contract (in)complet-
eness. With full transferability, any allocation of (u;(a;b) − u) between the two
3Imperfect transferability arises if it is too diﬃcult to contract on shares of proﬁts as a function
of the characteristics of the agents. One explanation for this is the diﬃculty to prevent renegotiation
and hold-up (Grossman and Hart, 1986): once a song is created, the other musicians could threaten
to leave the group or not to produce the song if they do not get a higher share of the surplus. If
the song created within the group has no value outside the group, this leads to equal sharing.
4partners is on the Pareto frontier; with limited transferability, the Pareto frontier
reduces to the pair ((a;b)/2;(a;b)/2). An equilibrium speciﬁes a matching func-
tion and a payoﬀ allocation in such a way that two matched agents have a feasible
allocation for this match and there exist no feasible payoﬀs for any two agents that
are strictly greater than their equilibrium payoﬀs.
As is well know, in the complete contracting case, the ex-ante formation of groups
will maximize total proﬁt in the band, and the way musicians match reﬂects their
comparative advantages. Here, since
@2(a;b)
@a@b = W − q − V < 0, the marginal pro-
ductivity of a given type is decreasing in the type of the partner. There is therefore
negative assortative matching in equilibrium and if m(a) is the match of a, we must
have by measure consistency that F(a) + F(m(a)) = 1; since we assume that F
is symmetric, it must be the case that m(a) = 1 − a. In this case, the expected
probability of success is
S(a) = pH − a(1 − a)(pH − pL); (1)
which is increasing in a for a ≥ 1/2 and decreases if a < 1/2. Because there is
negative assortative matching, the variance of types in the group varies with a, and
in particular the number of credits that each member receives also varies with a.
Note that the total number of credits in the group is a+m(a) = 1. It is independent
of a and therefore the shares of credits received by the partners in equilibrium are
(a;1 − a).4
By contrast, in the incomplete contracting case, each musician a wants to match
with the musician b that maximizes 1
2(a;b): the process of matching is no longer
governed by comparative advantage but by absolute advantage. Since (a;b) is
strictly increasing in b, all musicians want to match with the highest possible type,
and this leads to positive assortative matching: now, m(a) = a.5 The probability of
success is then
S(a) = pH − (1 − a)
2(pH − pL) (2)
4a is the only one to receive credit with probability a2 and shares the credit with the other
member with probability a(1 − a).
5This is true for any distribution F.
5which is increasing in a.
2.2 Matchings, sharing and outsourcing
The “dispersion of creativity” measure that we use is a “normalized” Herﬁndahl
index: the sum of the squares of the shares of credits divided by the total expected
number of credits in the group. In the complete contracting case, this index is
D(a) = a
2 + (1 − a)
2 (3)
which is increasing in a > 1/2 and decreasing in a < 1/2. There is therefore a
positive covariation between S and D in the complete contracting case.
If contracts are incomplete, the number of credits that go to each member is a






which is decreasing in a. There is therefore a negative covariation between S and D
in the incomplete contracting case.
There also exists a covariation between outsourcing (buying a song instead of
creating it) and dispersion. It is easy to see that, in the case of complete contracting,
outsourcing is equal to
O(a) = a(1 − a) (5)
which is increasing for a < 1/2, and then decreasing. By contrast, if contracts are
incomplete
O(a) = (1 − a)
2 (6)
which is decreasing in a.
This leads to the following proposition, which will guide our empirical strategy
in the next section.
6Proposition In the complete contracting case, there is a positive covariation between
the expected probability of a hit and the dispersion of credits within the group. This
covariation is negative in the incomplete contracting case. The covariation between
outsourcing and dispersion is negative in the ﬁrst case and positive in the second
one.
The model developed here deals with two-member bands. In reality, the number
of members who are credited is sometimes larger than two, but the basic insight
concerning matchings and the (in)completeness would not be diﬀerent.
3 Data
The database consists of albums created by all 151 bands that are listed in Dodd’s
(2001) Book of Rock and started their career between 1970 and 1979. Dodd’s def-
inition of rock includes not only the most important artists in the genre but also
musicians who had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the pop/rock scene. Larkin’s (2006)
Encyclopedia of Popular Music is used to establish discographies. To treat each
band equally, we adopted a 25 years span limit for all of them. For example if a
band released its ﬁrst album in 1975 we track its discography up to 2000. In most
cases, the lifetime of a group is shorter than 25 years and in any case 25 years is a
period long enough to be representative of a musician’s creative output. Compilation
or live albums which collect songs from diﬀerent studio albums are excluded. The
ﬁnal database consists of 1,494 albums released between 1970 and 2004 by 151 bands.
Since we are interested in bands where several members are active, we excluded al-
bums in which all credits go to a unique musician. This reduced the database to 107
bands and 982 albums.
Certiﬁcations awarded by the Recording Industry Association of America (R. I.
A. A.) are used as proxies for success. R. I. A. A. awards albums that reach a minimal
number of sales. Gold and platinum awards (introduced before 1976) certify sales of
500,000 and 1,000,000 units, respectively. Multi-platinum (2 million units sold) and
diamond (10 million) awards were introduced in 1984 and 1999 respectively. To avoid
7“backward spillover eﬀects” due to awards given to new releases of old albums, the
only certiﬁcations taken into account are those obtained at most one year after the
date of the ﬁrst release. This leads to 110 platinum (multi-platinum and diamond)
and 123 gold awards, while 749 out of the total of 982 albums received no award.
Two reasons led us to use albums instead of bands. First, bands are often unsta-
ble. Though the name of the band may remain the same, members change, and it
would have been diﬃcult to deal with such changes, which amount to 37%. Second,
the number of albums is much larger than the number of bands. This turns out to
assume that each album is produced by a diﬀerent band.
Following our theoretical model, two variables deﬁne the internal organization of
a band, or here, of an album: dispersion and outsourcing. Dispersion is deﬁned as
the Herﬁndahl index divided by the total number of credits. Outsourcing measures
the share of songs that a band buys on the market for songs. On average, 6% of the
production is outsourced.6 Success is represented by a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if the album received at least a gold award, and 0 otherwise.7
Table 1 gives an overview of the data. It is useful to note that the percentage
of awards is roughly the same for soloists (21%) and for groups (24%), but soloists
have to outsource three times more than groups.
4 Results and Conclusions
Proposition 1 provides an easy way to test which model (complete or incomplete
contracting) is relevant, since the sign of the correlation between success and dis-
persion, and between outsourcing and dispersion tells us which type of contract is
signed. Results are summarized in Table 2. Since success is a dichotomous vari-
able, we simply test whether the diﬀerence in mean dispersion is diﬀerent in the
case of no success and success. The test shows that the diﬀerence is signiﬁcantly
negative and has a very low probability (0.0002) of being positive. Similar results
are obtained with logit regressions, whether we introduce or not exogenous control
6Note that dispersion and outsourcing are calculated as above, but may diﬀer across albums.
7Separating gold from platinum and multi-platinum, does not change the results.
8variables.8The coeﬃcient of success on dispersion is signiﬁcantly negative in all cases.
The correlation coeﬃcient between outsourcing and dispersion is equal to 0.09 which
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 0.5% probability level. Both results lead the
conclusion that contracts are incomplete and there is positive assortative matching
of partners in a band.
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9Table 1. Description of the database
Soloists Groups
No. of bands 44 107
No. of albums 512 982
No. of (multi-)platinum and diamond awards 66 110
No. of gold awards 41 123
No. of albums with no award 405 749
Average dispersion 1 0.04
% of changes in the composition of bands 0 37
% of outsourcing 20 6
“Soloists” are bands where all the credits go to a unique member (Michael Jackson, for
example). “Groups” are those who distribute credits to several members (Led Zeppelin).We
assume that if the leader of a solo band changes, the name of the band changes.
10Table 2. Estimation Results (success and dispersion)
Groups Only
Comparison of means of dispersions
Success = 0 0.050
Success = 1 0.026
Diﬀerence of means -0.024 (-3.56)
H0 : Diﬀerence < 0 Pr = 0.9998
Coeﬃcients of logit regressions, dependent variable is success
Dispersion only -8.46 (-3.81)
Intercept -0.88 (-8.99)
Dispersion -10.77 (-3.88)
USA group 0.91 (5.52)
Major label 2.10 (8.25)
Piracy -0.63 (-1.11)
Intercept -2.80 (-10.90)
No. of observations 982
Note: t-value for the comparison of means’ test; z-values for
the coeﬃcients of the logit regression
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